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Abstract—Local Differential Privacy (LDP) provides provable
privacy protection for data collection without the assumption
of the trusted data server. In the real-world scenario, different
data have different privacy requirements due to the distinct
sensitivity levels. However, LDP provides the same protection
for all data. In this paper, we tackle the challenge of providing
input-discriminative protection to reflect the distinct privacy
requirements of different inputs. We first present the Input-
Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) privacy notion and focus on a
specific version termed MinID-LDP, which is shown to be a fine-
grained version of LDP. Then, we develop the IDUE mechanism
based on Unary Encoding for single-item input and the extended
mechanism IDUE-PS (with Padding-and-Sampling protocol) for
item-set input. The results on both synthetic and real-world
datasets validate the correctness of our theoretical analysis and
show that the proposed mechanisms satisfying MinID-LDP have
better utility than the state-of-the-art mechanisms satisfying LDP
due to the input-discriminative protection.
Index Terms—local differential privacy, input-discriminative
protection, frequency estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential Privacy (DP) [1], [2] has become the de facto
standard for private data release. It provides provable privacy
protection, which is independent of the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge and computational power [3]. In recent
years, Local Differential Privacy (LDP) has been proposed
for preserving privacy at the data collection stage, in contrast
to DP in the centralized setting which protects data after it
is collected and stored by a server. In the local setting, the
server is assumed to be untrusted, and each user randomly
perturbs her raw data independently using a privacy-preserving
mechanism that satisfies LDP. Then, the server collects these
perturbed data from all users to perform data analytics or an-
swer queries from users or third parties. Thus the local setting
has been widely adopted in practice. For example, RAPPOR
[4] proposed by Google has been employed in Chrome to
collect web browsing behavior with LDP guarantees; Apple is
also using LDP-based mechanism to identify popular emojis
and popular health data types in Safari [5].
Under the notion of LDP, given any output of a mechanism,
the adversary cannot distinguish any pair of inputs with high
confidence (controlled by a privacy budget ). Due to the uni-
form privacy budget, the existing mechanisms and applications
that have been proposed with LDP, such as RAPPOR [4],
Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) [6], SVIM (for set-valued
data) [7], and PrivKV (for key-value data) [8], would perturb
the data in the same way (or add the noise with the same
amount) for any inputs. However, in many practical scenarios,
different inputs have different degrees of sensitivity (i.e.,
users’ desired privacy level or privacy expectation on the raw
data) thus require distinct levels of privacy. For example, in
website-click records or medical records, some website pages
or medical diseases (e.g., HIV and cancer) are much more
sensitive than others, thus need stronger privacy guarantees;
on the other hand, some records are much less sensitive, such
as frequently visited pages (e.g., Facebook and Amazon) that
are commonly clicked by many people, or some very common
symptoms in clinic such as flu and headache. Existing notions
do not deal with this scenario. For example, personalized
local differential privacy (PLDP) [9] only provides user-level
discrimination, and geo-indistinguishability [10] only provides
distance based discrimination for a pair of locations.
Motivated by such considerations, we consider the cate-
gorical data and assume the universe of inputs have multiple
levels of privacy, represented by privacy budgets with different
values. Note that a smaller budget indicates higher privacy
requirement thus needs more protection. In practice, classify-
ing items by privacy levels can be implemented according to
some categories with semantic meanings. For example, serious
diseases (e.g., various cancers or HIV) can be classified in the
highest privacy level, while moderate diseases (e.g., asthma
or hypertension) and common symptoms can be classified
in the medium and lowest privacy levels respectively. Since
each possible input x in domain D has its privacy budget x
(inputs with the same privacy level have the same budget), the
privacy budget of standard LDP should be  = minx∈D{x}
to satisfy the required privacy for all inputs. This notion would
provide excessive protection for some inputs that do not need
such strong privacy, which is unnecessary and will lead to an
inferior privacy-utility tradeoff.
In this paper, we aim at providing input-discriminative
privacy with required distinct protection for each input and
high utility on frequency estimation. We first study how
to formalize a privacy notion in the local setting that pro-
vides discriminative privacy protection for different inputs.
We propose a notion called Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-
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LDP) by converting the differentiated protection for inputs
into different indistinguishability level for pairs of inputs.
Theoretically, the indistinguishability of a pair of inputs x, x′
can be any function of their budgets x, x′ , in this paper
we focus on one instantiation of ID-LDP, termed MinID-
LDP with the minimum function. MinID-LDP relaxes LDP
on the inputs that do not need too strong privacy protection
and we will show that the relaxation is at most twice of the
budget of LDP under a fully-connected indistinguishability
graph (in Lemma 1). In summary, MinID-LDP can provide
fine-grained protection where each input is protected with
required indistinguishability, while LDP would provide the
same protection for all inputs with the highest privacy level.
Under our MinID-LDP notion, users need to perturb dif-
ferent inputs with different parameters related to the distinct
privacy budgets. However, in the local setting, the privacy
requirement should be satisfied for any pair of inputs x, x′
and any output y, which makes the problem complicated
since the perturbation parameter of a specific input may
also depend on other inputs’ privacy budgets. To find the
optimal mechanism for a real-world query function, a potential
solution is to formulate an optimization problem with the
goal of maximizing query utility given privacy as constraints.
However, it will involve too many variables and constraints.
For example, assume the domain size (the number of inputs)
is m, and the mechanism perturbs all inputs into another one
by a perturbation matrix P ∈ Rm×m, where each element
represents the probability of perturbing one input into another
one. Then, the problem of finding the optimal perturbation
probabilities has m2 variables and m3 privacy constraints (for
any pair of inputs and any output), which makes it impractical
for real-world data with a large domain.
In this paper, we design two efficient and near-optimal
mechanisms satisfying ID-LDP for frequency estimation on
single-item and item-set data respectively. First, we propose
the Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE) mechanism
for single-item input. In our optimization problem of assigning
the perturbation probabilities in IDUE, the number of variables
and constraints are reduced to 2t and t2 respectively (t is the
number of privacy levels). The IDUE mechanism works well
for single-item data. However, when the input is an item-set,
i.e., any subset of the item domain, solving the optimization
problem to determine the perturbation probabilities is not
scalable due to an exponential blowup of the number of sub-
sets. Thus, we combine our IDUE mechanism with Padding-
and-Sampling (PS) protocol [7] to design a novel IDUE-PS
mechanism for set-valued data. The privacy budget of a set is
a function of the individual privacy budgets of items in the set.
We will show that the perturbation probabilities of IDUE-PS
(for item-set input with an exponential blowup) can be deter-
mined by IDUE (for single-item input) to satisfy MinID-LDP
(in Theorem 4) with a scalable optimization problem. Given
the privacy level of each input, our proposed mechanisms
satisfying MinID-LDP provide better privacy-utility tradeoff
than -LDP (where  = minx∈D{x}). It is because our
mechanisms achieve fine-grained privacy protection; whereas,
the existing mechanisms satisfying LDP guarantee the highest
privacy level.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contri-
butions in this paper.
(1) We introduce a new privacy notion called Input-
Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) with an instantiation termed
MinID-LDP, which allows finer-grained protection for differ-
ent inputs than LDP.
(2) We design the Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding
(IDUE) mechanism for single-item input that satisfies MinID-
LDP and propose the frequency estimation protocol with
an unbiased estimator. To minimize the Mean Square Error
(MSE) of IDUE, we formulate an optimization problem to
solve the perturbation probabilities for the mechanism and
derive three practical variants of the optimization model.
(3) We propose the IDUE-PS mechanism for item-set in-
puts by extending the IDUE mechanism with Padding-and-
Sampling (PS) technique and show that IDUE-PS satisfies
the notion of MinID-LDP with the same computation cost as
IDUE that is designed for single-item input.
(4) We validate the correctness of the theoretical MSE
analysis and effectiveness of our notion and mechanisms on
synthetic and real-world datasets with both single-item and
item-set types of input. We show that the proposed mecha-
nisms outperform the existing ones for frequency estimation on
categorical data. Also, the advantage of our mechanisms under
the MinID-LDP notion is enhanced when the distribution of
privacy budgets of all inputs are more skewed.
II. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy (DP) in centralized setting
was first introduced by Dwork in [1]. It assumes a trusted
server that possesses all genuine dataset. Then, a number of
variants of differential privacy have been studied to provide
different types of privacy guarantees such as d-privacy [11],
Pufferfish privacy [12], Blowfish privacy [13], Bayesian DP
[14], concentrated DP [15], and personalized DP [16]. On the
other hand, Duchi et al. [17] studied the local differential
privacy (LDP) without the assumption of a trusted server
and several variants of LDP have been studied, e.g., geo-
indistinguishability [10], personalized LDP [18], and local
information privacy (LIP) [19]. The most related work is
the notion of Utility-optimized LDP (ULDP) developed by
Murakami and Kawamoto [20], which provides a privacy
guarantee equivalent to LDP only for sensitive data to allow
less noise and improve utility. However, this work assumes
each user sends a single datum (we discuss the case of item-set
input in Section VI) and is only applicable to the case of two
privacy levels where one of them is non-sensitive (i.e., privacy
budget  = ∞). Also, ULDP provides distinct protection for
two levels of outputs (protected and invertible) and is a strict
relaxation of LDP (i.e., LDP guarantees ULDP, but ULDP
does not provide -LDP for any  ∈ [0,∞)), while our MinID-
LDP provides distinct bounds of privacy leakage for multiple
(more than two) privacy levels of inputs and also guarantees
LDP with some privacy budgets (see Lemma 1).
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III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem Statement
System Model. Our system model involves one data server
and n users U = {u1, u2, · · · , un}. Each user possesses
one item or item-set and perturbs it independently via a
random perturbation mechanism before uploading it to the
server. Then, the server collects users’ data and computes
the statistical information of users’ data (we focus on fre-
quency estimation in this paper). Denote the item domain
I = {1, 2, · · · ,m} with size m, and the item-set domain
P(I) = {x|x ⊆ I} with size 2m, where P(I) is the power set
of I. In this paper, we consider two types of input (raw data),
one is the single-item input with domain D = I, where each
user only possesses one item from I; another is the item-set
input with domain D = P(I), where each user can possess
any subset of I. We assume there are t privacy levels for the
items in I, where the i-th level only contains a subset of I,
denoted by Ii. While the domain of the items can be large, the
number of privacy levels determined by categories is usually
small in practice, hence ensuring usability and scalability of
the system. For convenience, we denote the set of privacy
budgets of all items in I as E = {i}i∈I .
Threat Model. We assume the server is untrusted, and each
user only trusts herself, because data stored on the server can
be revealed via either hacking activities or due to the server
selling the data to a third party. Therefore, the adversary is
assumed to possess the uploaded (perturbed) data of all users
and it also knows the privacy budgets for all the inputs.
Utility of Frequency Estimation. The true frequency of an
item i ∈ I is defined as the number of users who possess i
c∗i =
∑
u∈U 1xu(i) (∀i ∈ I) (1)
where xu is the raw (input) data of a user u ∈ U and can
be a single-item or an item-set depending on the application
scenario, and 1xu(i) is the indicator function, which equals
to 1 if i ∈ xu and equals to 0 otherwise. Note that i only
denotes one item from I, while x can be a subset of I. After
collecting the perturbed (output) data from all users, the server
can estimate the frequency of an item i ∈ I via an estimator
cˆi, which is a function of the perturbed data {yu}u∈U and
mechanism parameters. The utility of frequency estimation is
defined by the total Mean Square Error (MSE) of estimators,
i.e., MSE =
∑m
i=1 MSEcˆi , which will be minimized in the
design of mechanism with privacy constraints.
B. The Notion of LDP
In the local setting, each user independently perturbs her
input x (raw data) using a mechanism M and uploads M(x)
to the server for data analysis.
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [17]) For a
given  ∈ R+, a randomized mechanism M satisfies -LDP
if and only if for any pair of inputs x, x′, and any output
y ∈ Range(M)
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) 6 e
 (2)
where Range(M) is the set of all possible outputs of the
randomized mechanism M.
Intuitively, given an output y of a mechanism M, an
adversary cannot infer with high confidence (controlled by
) whether the input is x or x′, which provides plausible
deniability for individuals involved in the sensitive data. Here,
 is a parameter called the privacy budget that controls the
strength of privacy protection. A smaller  indicates stronger
privacy protection because the adversary has lower confidence
when trying to distinguish any pair of inputs x, x′. LDP has
the property of sequential composition, which guarantees the
overall privacy for a sequence of mechanisms that satisfy LDP.
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition of LDP [21]) If ran-
domized mechanism Mi : D → Ri satisfies i-LDP for
i = 1, 2, · · · , k, then their sequential combination M : D →
R1 × R2 × · · · × Rk defined by M = (M1,M2, · · · ,Mk)
satisfies (
∑k
i=1 i)-LDP.
According to sequential composition, a given privacy budget 
can be split into multiple portions, where each portion corre-
sponds to the privacy budget of a randomized mechanism. The
sequential composition is commonly used for some complex
data analysis tasks, where multiple perturbation phases are
utilized to improve the utility.
C. Mechanisms Satisfying LDP
Randomized Response. Randomized Response (RR) [22]
is a technique developed for the interviewees in a survey to
return a randomized answer to a sensitive question so that the
interviewees can enjoy the plausible deniability. Specifically,
each interviewee gives a genuine answer with probability p
and gives the opposite answer with probability 1−p. In order
to satisfy -LDP, the probability is selected as p = e

e+1 . The
standard RR only works for binary data (yes-or-no answers),
but it can be extended to apply to m categories by Generalized
Randomized Response or Unary Encoding.
Generalized Randomized Response. The perturbation
function in Generalized Randomized Response (GRR) [7] is
Pr(M(x) = y) =
{
p, if y = x
q, if y 6= x , (∀x, y = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
where x is the input and y is the output. To satisfy -LDP,
the probabilities are p = e

e+m−1 and q =
1
e+m−1 , both of
which would be small when the domain size m is very large
compared with e.
Unary Encoding. The Unary Encoding (UE) [6] con-
verts the input x = i into an m-length vector x =
[0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] where only the i-th position is 1. Then
each user perturbs each bit of x independently with the
following probabilities
Pr(y[k] = 1) =
{
p, if x[k] = 1
q, if x[k] = 0
(∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
where y is the output vector. It was shown in [6] that this
mechanism satisfies LDP with  = ln
(
p(1−q)
(1−p)q
)
. The selection
of p and q under a given privacy budget  varies for different
3
mechanisms. For example, the basic RAPPOR [4] assigns p =
e/2
e/2+1
, q = 1−p, while the Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE)
[6] assigns p = 12 , q =
1
e+1 , which is obtained by optimizing
the approximate variance.
Frequency Estimation for GRR, RAPPOR and OUE.
After receiving the perturbed data from all users, the server
can implement the summation to get the total count of each
bit, denoted by ci for the i-th bit. Since the perturbation is
biased for bit-0 and bit-1, the server needs to calibrate the
collected counts by an unbiased estimator [6]
cˆi =
ci − nq
p− q (3)
whose Mean Square Error (MSE) equals to its variance
MSEcˆi = Var[cˆi] =
nq(1− q)
(p− q)2 +
c∗i (1− p− q)
p− q
where c∗i is the ground truth of the counting for item i. In
summary, OUE can provide higher utility than RAPPOR for
frequency estimation under the same  due to the optimization,
and the utility of GRR would be deteriorated much more than
the other two mechanisms when domain size m is large.
IV. INPUT-DISCRIMINATIVE LDP
In this section, a new privacy notion called ID-LDP is
introduced, which can provide input-discriminative protection
with LDP. In ID-LDP, the indistinguishability level of a pair
of possible inputs x, x′ is determined by the corresponding
privacy levels x, x′ of both inputs. Then, one instantiation
of ID-LDP called MinID-LDP is formalized. It is proven to
satisfy sequential composition theorem, which is an important
property to guarantee the overall privacy for multiple query
functions sequentially applied to the same database. Finally,
our notion is compared with several existing privacy notions
in the local setting and their relations are discussed.
A. Definition
LDP defines privacy as the maximum level of indistin-
guishability between any two possible inputs x and x′. In
practical applications, the privacy levels of different inputs
could be distinct. Thus, the requirement of indistinguishability
between different pairs of possible inputs x and x′ could
be diverse. However, LDP cannot provide such fine-grained
privacy protection because its definition is based on the worst-
case scenario. Intuitively, discriminating inputs with different
privacy levels and providing distinct protection to them can
improve the utility of the query service due to the fine-
grained protection for different inputs. We define the Input-
Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) as follows.
Definition 2 (Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP)) For a
given privacy budget set E = {x}x∈D ∈ R|D|+ , where |D|
is the size of the input domain D, the randomized mechanism
M satisfies E-ID-LDP if and only if for any pair of inputs
x, x′ ∈ D, and any output y ∈ Range(M)
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) 6 e
r(x,x′ ) (4)
where r(·, ·) is a function of two privacy budgets.
In Definition 2, we assume inputs x and x′ belong to differ-
ent privacy levels with privacy budgets x and x′ respectively
and introduce a system-defined function r(x, x′) to quantify
the indistinguishability between x and x′. Note that the value
of x for each input x is not sensitive information because x
is independent of the users’ raw data. In this paper, we assume
{x}x∈D are universally set by the service provider. Note that,
our notion can be easily combined with personalized LDP
(PLDP) to reflect different privacy preferences of different
users, in which case the privacy levels of all inputs can be set
by users themselves. Theoretically, the notion of ID-LDP does
not restrict the data type, which means it can be applied for
categorical data, numerical data, or even the hybrid with multi-
dimensions. In this paper, we mainly study the mechanism that
satisfies ID-LDP for categorical data (single-item or item-set).
ID-LDP can provide input-discriminative protection with
the function r(·, ·). In this paper, we mainly consider the
minimum function between x and x′ as the privacy budget of
a pair of inputs x, x′, formulated by the following definition.
Definition 3 (MinID-LDP) A randomized mechanism M
satisfies E-MinID-LDP if and only if it satisfies E-ID-LDP
with r(x, x′) = min{x, x′}, where E is the set of privacy
budgets of all inputs.
Intuitively, for any pair of inputs x, x′, MinID-LDP guar-
antees that the adversary’s capability of distinguishing x and
x′ would not exceed the bound controlled by both x and x′ ,
which achieves the worse-case privacy like LDP but only for
the pair. As mentioned in Section III, sequential composition
is an important property to guarantee the overall privacy for a
sequence of mechanisms. The following theorem shows that
MinID-LDP satisfies sequential composition as well.
Theorem 2 (Sequential Composition of MinID-LDP) If
randomized mechanism Mi : D → Ri satisfies Ei-MinID-
LDP for i = 1, 2, · · · , k, where Ei = {(i)x }x∈D ∈ R|D|+ , then
their combination M : D → R1 ×R2 × · · · × Rk defined by
M = (M1,M2, · · · ,Mk) satisfies (
∑k
i=1 Ei)-MinID-LDP,
where (
∑k
i=1 Ei) , {
∑k
i=1 
(i)
x }x∈D.
Proof: Let x, x′ ∈ D be any pair of inputs, for any output
y = (y1, y2, · · · , yk) ∈ R1 ×R2 × · · · × Rk, we have
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) =
k∏
i=1
Pr(Mi(x) = yi)
Pr(Mi(x′) = yi) 6
k∏
i=1
emin{
(i)
x ,
(i)
x′ }
6
k∏
i=1
e
(i)
x = e
∑k
i=1 
(i)
x
Similarly, Pr(M(x)=y)Pr(M(x′)=y) 6 e
∑k
i=1 
(i)
x′ . Finally, we have
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) 6 e
min
{∑k
i=1 
(i)
x ,
∑k
i=1 
(i)
x′
}
which indicates that M satisfies (∑ki=1 Ei)-MinID-LDP.
B. Relationships and Comparison with Other Notions
Several privacy notions are related to our notion, but they
have different ideas. The notion of LDP provides the worst-
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Fig. 1: Privacy budget of a pair of inputs in different privacy notions.
case privacy protection for all users and all inputs, where the
global privacy budget is  = minx∈D{x} to satisfy -LDP.
The notion of personalized local differential privacy (PLDP)
[9], [18] provides user-discriminative privacy requirements,
i.e., each user can have different privacy budget which is often
assumed to be unrelated to the raw data if it would be pub-
lished. Geo-indistinguishability [10], on the other hand, can
provide distance-discriminative privacy, but it originates from
an input pair-centric viewpoint and requires a distance metric
for the inputs. In contrast, our notion MinID-LDP provides
input-discriminative privacy requirements, where each input
has a privacy budget, and the distinguishability of a pair of
inputs can be determined by a function of the budgets of the
two inputs to bound the distinguishability of this pair.
Privacy Budget of a Pair of Inputs. In Fig. 1, we use
a graph to show the difference among LDP [17], personal-
ized LDP (PLDP) [18], geo-indistinguishability [10], and our
notion ID-LDP, where the vertices are inputs and edges are
the distinguishability level (represented by privacy budget) of
each pair of inputs. We can observe that LDP would utilize
the same budget  for all users and all pairs of inputs; PLDP
provides different protections for different users but does not
differentiate different pairs of inputs; geo-indistinguishability
differentiate different pairs by the distance between them but
the distance metric does not work for all data types; ID-
LDP differentiates the pairs by the privacy budgets of the two
inputs. The difference between LDP and MinID-LDP is that
for a pair of inputs x, x′, the budget of a pair in LDP is the
minimum values of all budgets that are independent of the
pair, while the budget of a pair in MinID-LDP is the minimum
values between the two budgets x, x′ of inputs.
Relationships with LDP. If the privacy budgets for all
inputs are the same, i.e., x =  for all x ∈ D, then E-
MinID-LDP becomes -LDP, which means MinID-LDP is a
generalized version of LDP. In general, we have the following
lemma to show their relationships.
Lemma 1 If a mechanism satisfies -LDP, then it also satisfies
E-MinID-LDP for all E with min{E} = . On the other hand,
if a mechanism satisfies E-MinID-LDP, then it also satisfies
-LDP, where  = min{max{E}, 2 min{E}}.
Proof: First, the following property can be directly de-
rived from the definitions of LDP and MinID-LDP
min{E}-LDP⇒ E-MinID-LDP⇒ max{E}-LDP
Therefore, we only need to show that E-MinID-LDP also
implies (2 min{E})-LDP. Denote x∗ as the input that has the
minimum budget, i.e., x∗ = min{E}. Then, for all x, x′ and
y, the following inequality is satisfied under E-MinID-LDP
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) =
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x∗) = y) ·
Pr(M(x∗) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y)
6 ex∗ · ex∗ = e2x∗ = e2 min{E}
which means E-MinID-LDP implies (2 min{E})-LDP.
From Lemma 1, MinID-LDP relaxes LDP in at most twice
of the privacy budget  = min{E}. It is due to the symmetric
property of the indistinguishability definition, so in a fully-
connected policy graph, if we require every pair of inputs
x, x′ to be indistinguishable with min{x, x′}, transitivity
of indistinguishability yields 2 min{E} between any pair of
inputs. Note that the twice relaxation in privacy budget does
not mean utility improvement is at most twice compared to
LDP (depending on the query and data distribution). Although
MinID-LDP can be regarded as a relaxation compared with
LDP, in practice users’ privacy expectation is naturally differ-
ent for different inputs, hence our notion captures user’s fine-
grained requirement, while LDP is too strong (i.e., provides
overprotection) in this regard.
Prior-Posterior Privacy Leakage Analysis. To understand
our privacy notions in another perspective, we compare the
prior-posterior privacy leakage (i.e., Local Information Privacy
[19]) of the above notions. Denote Pr(y|x) as the probability
of outputting y by given input x. The ratio between the prior
probability Pr(x) of an input x and the posterior probability
Pr(x|y) by observing the output y can be computed as
Pr(x)
Pr(x|y) =
Pr(y)
Pr(y|x) =
∑
x′∈D Pr(x
′) Pr(y|x′)
Pr(y|x) (5)
which quantifies the privacy leakage that the additional infor-
mation the adversary can infer about an input x by observing
the output y. Note that (5) is different from mutual information
[23] that quantifies the average leakage for all inputs and
outputs. In our case, we only evaluate the bound of privacy
leakage for a given input x with an arbitrary output y. For
different privacy notions, the lower bound and upper bound
(independent of y) of prior-posterior privacy leakage defined
by (5) are summarized in Table I (can be directly derived
from definitions or Lemma 1). The notion of LDP, PLDP,
and MinID-LDP have the similar bound of privacy leakage
for input x with respect to the budget (though MinID-LDP
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TABLE I: The bounds of prior-posterior Pr(x)Pr(x|y) (∀x, y).
Privacy Notions Lower Bound Upper Bound
LDP e− e
PLDP e−u eu
Geo-Ind
∑
x′ Pr(x
′)e−·d(x,x
′) ∑
x′ Pr(x
′)e·d(x,x
′)
MinID-LDP e−min{x,2min{E}} emin{x,2min{E}}
has an additional bound with respect to 2 min{E}). However,
LDP and PLDP do not differentiate the inputs, thus the budget
would be assigned as the minimum value of all budgets
in order to satisfy the privacy, but MinID-LDP can assign
the required budget for different inputs, where the bound of
leakage is also input-discriminative.
C. Discussions
Additional Gain from Incomplete Privacy Policy Graph.
According to Lemma 1, the gain of MinID-LDP compared
with LDP is at most twice of the privacy budget, which is
caused by the required privacy protection on all pairs of inputs
(i.e., complete graph shown in Fig. 1). However, if some of
the pairs do not need to be protected (such incomplete graph
can be defined by the secret policy in Blowfish privacy [13]),
the gain of MinID-LDP can be larger than 2 min{E} because
some inputs might not need to be indistinguishable from the
inputs with the smallest privacy budget.
Other Instantiations of ID-LDP. Besides MinID-LDP,
other instantiations of ID-LDP can be defined. For example,
we can define AvgID-LDP as ID-LDP with the average
function, i.e., r(x, x′) = (x + x′)/2, which bounds the
privacy budget of a pair of inputs by the averaged budget of the
two inputs. Similar to MinID-LDP, the notion of AvgID-LDP
satisfies sequential composition like Theorem 2. Moreover, the
perturbation mechanisms developed in Section V and Section
VI are also applicable to AvgID-LDP.
V. PERTURBATION MECHANISM AND FREQUENCY
ESTIMATION FOR SINGLE-ITEM INPUT
In this section, the considered input domain is D = I, i.e.,
single-item input. First, we formulate the optimization problem
for designing a perturbation mechanism to optimize the utility
of the frequency estimation of the outputs while satisfying
MinID-LDP and the challenges to solve the problem. To
address the challenges, we propose the Input-Discriminative
Unary Encoding (IDUE) mechanism and the corresponding
unbiased frequency estimator. The objective function in op-
timization problem of solving perturbation probabilities is
designed to be independent of the unknown true frequencies.
A. Objectives and Challenges
Our goal is to design a framework with perturbation mech-
anism and frequency estimation protocol that satisfies the
proposed notion ID-LDP (MinID-LDP specifically) with the
optimal or near-optimal utility of frequency estimation. The
general optimization problem can be modeled as
min MSE, s.t.
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6 exp(r(x, x′)) (∀x, x
′, y)
Algorithm 1 IDUE for Single-Item Input
Input: Single-item input x ∈ I and perturbation probabilities ai
and bi for i ∈ I.
Output: Vector y ∈ {0, 1}m
1: Encode x = i into a vector x = vi defined in (6)
2: for k = 1 to m do
3: if x[k] = 1 then
4: Randomly draw y[k] ∼ Bernoulli(ak)
5: else
6: Randomly draw y[k] ∼ Bernoulli(bk)
7: end if
8: end for
A direct way to design such mechanism is to assign a perturba-
tion matrix P ∈ R|D|×|D|, where each element represents the
perturbation probability Pr(y|x) for all x, y ∈ D (the output
domain R = D in this case). Then, the elements in matrix
P can be solved by an optimization problem to minimize the
MSE of frequency estimation under the privacy constraints.
However, this mechanism has several issues in practice. First,
the MSE of frequency estimation involves true frequencies,
which means the objective function of minimizing MSE cannot
be directly evaluated. Second, since the number of variables
is |D|2 and the number of constraints is |D|3, the computation
cost would be very high for D = P(I) with |D| = 2m.
Third, when the domain size |D| is very large, which is very
common in practice, the perturbation probabilities will become
very small because of
∑
y∈D Pr(y|x) = 1, which means the
probability of reporting the true value is low, then the utility
would greatly deteriorate.
In the following, we propose the Unary Encoding based
perturbation mechanism and frequency estimation protocol
for single-item input with D = I, where the corresponding
optimization problem (discussed in Section V-D) only has
2t variables and t2 constraints (t is the number of privacy
levels). Then, this framework is extended with Padding-and-
Sampling protocol in Section VI to accommodate item-set
input, where the determination of the perturbation probabilities
in the mechanism can be converted into the case of single-item
input, which has much less computational complexity.
B. Mechanism Design
Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE). We first
encode the single-item input x = i into a m-length vector
x = vi = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] (6)
where vector x denotes the encoded input, vi denotes the
vector whose i-th position is 1 and other positions are 0s.
Then, each bit of the input vector x is perturbed into 0 or 1
independently to get the output vector y with probabilities
Pr(y[k] = 1|x[k] = 1) = ak, Pr(y[k] = 0|x[k] = 1) = 1− ak
Pr(y[k] = 1|x[k] = 0) = bk, Pr(y[k] = 0|x[k] = 0) = 1− bk
where we assume ak > bk (∀k ∈ I) in order to obtain a
good utility. Algorithm 1 shows the steps of the proposed
perturbation mechanism called Input-Discriminative Unary
Encoding (IDUE). Compared with the original Unary En-
coding protocol [6], the IDUE assigns different perturbation
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probabilities for different bits, which is the key point to achieve
input-discriminative protection.
For two different input vectors vi (only the i-th bit is 1)
and vj , the probability ratio of distinguishing the pair of vi
and vj by observing the output vector y is
Pr(y|vi)
Pr(y|vj) =
∏m
k=1 Pr(y[k]|vi)∏m
k=1 Pr(y[k]|vj)
=
Pr(y[i]|vi) Pr(y[j]|vi)
Pr(y[i]|vj) Pr(y[j]|vj)
Since ak > bk (∀k ∈ I), we have
Pr(y[i]|vi) Pr(y[j]|vi)
Pr(y[i]|vj) Pr(y[j]|vj) =
(aibi )
y[i]( 1−ai1−bi )
1−y[i]
(
aj
bj
)y[j](
1−aj
1−bj )
1−y[j] 6
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− aj)
where the left side equals the right side if and only if y[i] = 1
and y[j] = 0. Then, the privacy constraint in (4) is
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− aj) 6 e
r(i,j) (∀i, j ∈ I) (7)
By converting the original privacy constraint into (7), which is
independent of y, we can reduce the computational complexity
than the direct formulation described in Section V-A.
To obtain the optimal perturbation probabilities for our
IDUE mechanism, we first develop the frequency estimator
to apply for IDUE, and evaluate the theoretical MSE of the
estimator as a function of perturbation probabilities. Then we
formalize the optimization problem with three variants by
minimizing the MSE with the privacy constraints in (7).
C. Frequency Estimation
Denote the collected frequency of i-th bit as ci =∑
u∈U yu[i], where yu is the output vector of a user u ∈ U .
For frequency estimation, we utilize the following estimator
cˆi =
ci − nbi
ai − bi (8)
and briefly show that cˆi is an unbiased estimator of the true
frequency c∗i defined in (1).
Theorem 3 (Unbiasedness Property) If ai 6= bi (∀i ∈ I),
then E[cˆi] = c∗i , where estimator cˆi is defined in (8).
Proof: Since E[ci] = c∗i ai +
∑
k 6=i c
∗
kbi = c
∗
i ai + (n −
c∗i )bi, then we have E[cˆi] =
E[ci]−nbi
ai−bi = c
∗
i , which means cˆi
is an unbiased estimator of c∗i .
The frequency estimator in (8) can be regarded as the
generalized version of the estimator in (3) that is used for the
original Unary Encoding. Due to the unbiasedness of estimator
cˆi, the MSE of cˆi equals to its variance
MSEcˆi = Var[cˆi] =
c∗i ai(1− ai) + (n− c∗i )bi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2
=
nbi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 +
c∗i (1− ai − bi)
ai − bi (9)
In Section V-D, the summation of MSEcˆi will be minimized
with the privacy constraint of ID-LDP.
D. Finding Optimal Perturbation Probabilities
As described in Section III-A, the input domain is divided
into t subsets I1, I2, · · · , It with different privacy levels.
Denote the number of items in subset Ii as |Ii| = mi and
the privacy budget is i (i = 1, 2, · · · , t). We can assign the
same parameters (ai, bi) for all items in Ii. If t = 1, i.e., all
items in I have the same , then this case reduces to the LDP
setting. The MSE of subset Ii is calculated by
MSEIi =
∑
k∈Ii
MSEcˆk =
nmibi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 +
(1− ai − bi)
ai − bi
∑
k∈Ii
c∗k
The expression of MSEIi is dependent on the true frequency∑
k∈Ii c
∗
k, which is unknown in practice, thus cannot be
established as the objective function for the optimization prob-
lem. Therefore, we propose three variants of the optimization
model, named opt0, opt1, and opt2, to make the objective
function independent of the true frequencies.
opt0: Optimization Model in the Worst-Case. Though
MSEIi is dependent on the true frequencies, we have the
following upper bound of the total MSE since
∑
k∈Ii c
∗
k 6 n
to get rid of unknown true frequency c∗k
t∑
i=1
MSEIi 6
t∑
i=1
nmibi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 + max
{
1− ai − bi
ai − bi
}
· n
which can be regarded as the total MSE in the worst-case.
Then, determining parameters {ai, bi}ti=1 is converted to min-
imizing the worst-case MSE
min
a,b
f ,
t∑
i=1
mibi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 + max
{
1− ai − bi
ai − bi
}
(10)
s.t.
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− aj) 6 e
r(i,j) (∀i, j = 1, 2, · · · , t)
0 < bi < ai < 1 (∀i = 1, 2, · · · , t)
where the scaling constant n is omitted since it does not
change the result. Since the feasible region of optimization
problem (10) contains the perturbation probabilities of RAP-
POR and OUE, the solution solved by (10) will have less
worst-case MSE than both RAPPOR and OUE.
It can be shown that the objective function in (10) is not
convex in the feasible region. But after further constraining the
variables (which shrinks the feasible region), the optimization
problem can be convex. We consider two types of space-
reducing strategies, which are related to RAPPOR and OUE
respectively. They can be used to find near-optimal solutions
with convex property and reduced complexity compared with
the formulation in (10).
opt1: Optimization Model Constrained with RAPPOR
Structure. By adding the additional constraint ai+bi = 1 (∀i),
we can represent ai, bi as
ai =
eτi
eτi + 1
, bi =
1
eτi + 1
(i = 1, 2, · · · , t) (11)
where τi > 0 (∀i). Then 1−ai−biai−bi = 0 and the total MSE is
t∑
i=1
MSEIi =
t∑
i=1
nmibi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 = n
t∑
i=1
mie
τi
(eτi − 1)2
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TABLE II: Utility comparison in the toy example. (1 = ln 4 and i = ln 6 (i 6= 1))
Mechanisms Privacy Notions
Probability of flipping the i-th bit Variance of frequency estimation Total variance
if x[i] = 1 if x[i] = 0 Var[cˆi] ∑
i Var[cˆi]i = 1 i = 2 ∼ 5 i = 1 i = 2 ∼ 5 i = 1 i = 2 ∼ 5
RAPPOR [4] LDP 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 2n 2n 10n
OUE [6] LDP 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.78n+ ci 1.78n+ ci 9.9n
IDUE MinID-LDP 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.28 3.27n+ 0.31ci 1.32n+ 0.13ci 8.68n ∼ 8.86n
with privacy constraints
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− aj) = e
τi+τj 6 er(i,j) ⇔ τi + τj 6 r(i, j)
Therefore, we can get the following optimization problem
min
τ1,··· ,τt>0
f(τ) ,
t∑
i=1
mie
τi
(eτi − 1)2 (12)
s.t. τi + τj 6 r(i, j) (∀i, j)
which has t variables (positive) and t2 linear constraints. It is
easy to validate that the Hessian matrix of the objective func-
tion f(τ) is positive-definite in the feasible region. Thus, the
optimization problem in (12) is convex with linear constraints.
opt2: Optimization Model Constrained with OUE
Structure. By adding the additional constraints ai = 1/2 (∀i),
we can rewrite the privacy constraints in (7) as
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− aj) =
1− bj
bi
6 er(i,j) ⇔ er(i,j) · bi + bj > 1
Since ai = 1/2, we have 1−ai−biai−bi = 1 (∀i), then the total
MSE can be represented by
t∑
i=1
nmibi(1− bi)
(ai − bi)2 +
t∑
i=1
∑
k∈Ii
c∗k =
t∑
i=1
nmibi(1− bi)
(0.5− bi)2 + n
Therefore, we can obtain the following optimization problem
(omit the scaling constant n)
min
0<bi<0.5
f(b) ,
t∑
i=1
mibi(1− bi)
(0.5− bi)2 + 1 (13)
s.t. er(i,j) · bi + bj > 1 (∀i, j)
which has t bounded variables and t2 linear constraints. The
Hessian matrix of the objective function f(b) is positive-
definite in the feasible region. Thus, the optimization problem
in (13) is also convex with linear constraints.
E. Comparison with LDP Mechanisms
We use a toy example to show the benefit of our mechanism
(IDUE) comparing with mechanisms satisfying LDP. Assume
a health organization is taking a survey which asks n users to
return a response from categories {HIV, flu, headache, stom-
achache, toothache}, indexed by an integer i from {1,2,3,4,5}.
Since the category HIV (i = 1) is more sensitive than the
others, the privacy budget that represents the privacy level
should be different. For example, we can set 1 = ln 4 for HIV
and i = ln 6 (i 6= 1) for the others, where a smaller  indicates
a higher privacy level that needs stronger privacy protection.
In order to protect privacy, the users randomly perturb their
true answers with a certain probability. Specifically, the users
first generate a vector x with five bits, where only the position
of the truth is 1 and other positions are 0s, then flip each bit
with assigned probabilities (depending on the mechanisms)
to generate the output vector y. Finally, the organization
aggregates all perturbed vectors y from n users and estimate
the counts of these categories by the estimator cˆi.
In Table II, we show that our proposed mechanism IDUE
outperforms the state-of-the-art mechanisms (RAPPOR [4]
and OUE [7]) under the given privacy levels of inputs, where
a smaller total variance
∑
i Var[cˆi] indicates a better utility. In
our IDUE mechanism, the flipping probabilities for i = 1 and
i 6= 1 are different due to the different privacy levels, while
mechanisms satisfying LDP (e.g., RAPPOR and OUE) do
not differentiate them. By adjusting the flipping probabilities
for different bits, IDUE can achieve the optimal utility with
the required protection. The total variance
∑
i Var[cˆi] of our
mechanism IDUE is in a range because it depends on the
distribution of true input data. We can see that the upper bound
is still less than that of the existing mechanisms, indicating that
our mechanisms outperform others even in the worst-case. For
IDUE under notion MinID-LDP, the probability of flipping the
bit for i = 1 is relatively large, which leads to a larger variance
of this bit, but allows other bits have less flipping probabilities
and smaller variance for i 6= 1.
VI. MECHANISM FOR ITEM-SET INPUT
In this section, we consider the item-set input, where the
input domain is D = P(I), i.e., the power set of I. If we
directly apply the IDUE mechanism developed in Section V
for this case, each possible set will need to be assigned two
perturbation probabilities (for bit-0 and bit-1), therefore the
computational cost of solving the optimization problem would
be very high because the size of the input domain is 2m. In
this section, we solve the scalability issue by extending the
IDUE mechanism with Padding-and-Sampling (PS) protocol
to adapt to item-set input. The privacy analysis shows that if
mechanism IDUE satisfies MinID-LDP, then the extended one
IDUE-PS satisfies this privacy as well.
A. The Padding-and-Sampling Protocol
Assume the raw data of each user is a set of items, where
the number of items in each set can be different. This problem
is more challenging than the single-item input even under LDP
notion because the user has more than one item, where each
item would split privacy budget (reporting all items will lead
to large noise in each item and thus bad utility of query).
However, if adopting sampling technique to avoid budget
splitting, the different number of items in each user makes
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Algorithm 2 Padding-and-Sampling (PS) [7]
Input: Item-set input x ∈ D and dummy set S with |S| = `.
Output: One item xs ∈ x ∪ S
1: Set the padded input xp ← x
2: if |x| < ` then
3: Select (` − |x|) dummy items with uniform random from S
and add them into xp
4: else if |x| > ` then
5: Drop out (|x| − `) items with uniform random from xp
6: end if
7: Sample one item xs with uniform random from xp
the frequency estimation much harder because the sampling
probability depends on the number of items of the user which
should be kept private. A good solution to address the item-set
type of input is the Padding-and-Sampling protocol [7].
The high-level idea of this Padding-and-Sampling protocol
is first converting the original item-set into a new item-set with
a fixed length ` by padding some dummy items (or truncating
those with length longer than `), and then sampling only one
item from the padded set for uploading. Algorithm 2 shows
the steps of this Padding-and-Sampling protocol, where the
given item-set input x ∈ D is padded (or truncated) into a
new set xp with a fixed length ` and finally one item xs is
randomly sampled from the padded set xp. The fixed length `
is a system parameter which will affect the utility in some way
(depending on the data distribution). More details of selecting
a good ` is discussed in [7]. In this paper, we assume ` is
given in advance.
B. Mechanism Design and Privacy Analysis
IDUE with Padding-and-Sampling for Item-set Input.
By adopting the Padding-and-Sampling (PS) protocol, our
previous mechanism IDUE (Algorithm 1) can be extended
for set-valued input. Algorithm 3 shows the steps (sampling,
encoding, and perturbing) of our extended mechanism named
IDUE-PS, where the data is perturbed according to the sam-
pled item’s parameters under the single item case. Since each
item will be sampled with probability 1` from the padded set
xp, the frequency estimation result needs to be multiplied by
the factor `, i.e., cˆi = ` · ci−nbiai−bi . Fig. 2 shows the diagram
of perturbation steps in the user-side and aggregation (on
frequency estimation) in the server-side.
Since the original item-set input x is padded with some
dummy items from a domain S that is disjoint from the
original item domain I, the item domain is extended to be
I∪S . We denote the new item domain I ′ = {1, 2, · · · ,m+`},
where the last ` items are dummy items. Since the size of I ′
is (m + `), the encoded vector x has (m + `) bits. Assume
the perturbation probabilities of i-th bit are ai, bi, and denote
αi =
ai
bi
, βi =
1− ai
1− bi (∀i ∈ I
′) (14)
Since αi − βi = ai−bibi(1−bi) and 0 < bi 6 ai < 1, we have
1 6 βi 6 αi, and αi = βi only when ai = bi. Before proving
the privacy guarantee of IDUE-PS, we show the following
useful lemma first.
Algorithm 3 IDUE-PS for Item-Set Input
Input: Item-set input x ∈ D and dummy set S with |S| = `.
Perturbation probabilities (ai, bi) for i ∈ I′.
Output: Vector y ∈ {0, 1}m+`
1: Let x = [0, · · · , 0] with length (m+ `)
2: Sample one item xs ∈ x ∪ S by PS protocol (Algorithm 2).
3: if xs = i ∈ I then
4: Let x[i] = 1
5: else if xs =⊥i∈ S then
6: Let x[m+ i] = 1
7: end if
8: for k = 1 to (m+ `) do
9: if x[k] = 1 then
10: Randomly draw y[k] ∼ Bernoulli(ak)
11: else
12: Randomly draw y[k] ∼ Bernoulli(bk)
13: end if
14: end for
1
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Fig. 2: The IDUE-PS mechanism for item-set input.
Lemma 2 For any item-set inputs x, x′ ∈ D, and any output
y of IDUE-PS (Algorithm 3), the following probability ratio
is bounded by
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6
ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x| + (1− ηx)
∑m+`
i=m+1
αi
`
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
βj
|x′| + (1− ηx′)
∑m+`
j=m+1
βj
`
(15)
where ηx =
|x|
max{|x|,`} and ηx′ =
|x′|
max{|x′|,`}
Proof: See Appendix A.
Considering αiβj =
ai(1−bj)
bi(1−aj) is the upper bound of
Pr(y|x=i)
Pr(y|x′=j) ,
the distinguishability of a pair of item-set inputs x and x′ in
(15) can be regarded as the combined distinguishability of the
items that belong to the two sets. The parameter ηx can be
explained as the probability of sampling i ∈ I from the padded
set xp of input x. If both |x| and |x′| are greater or equal to
` (then ηx = ηx′ = 1), the distinguishability of the pair is
averaged only among the items in the set; if not (then ηx < 1
or ηx′ < 1), the distinguishability of the dummy items will be
involved since the original set would be padded with dummy
items. From Lemma 2, we observe that the distinguishability
in IDUE-PS is determined by the privacy levels of the items
in the pair of inputs (besides the number of items in the input
set), which indicates that the IDUE-PS satisfies the notion of
MinID-LDP in some way (discussed below).
Privacy Analysis. In (15), the upper bound of the proba-
bility ratio Pr(y|x)Pr(y|x′) are related to the perturbation probabilities
of dummy items, i.e., ai and bi for i = m + 1, · · · ,m + `.
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Since the dummy items themselves are not sensitive, we
can select some reasonable values as their privacy levels.
In this paper, we assume the privacy levels and perturbation
probabilities of different dummy items are the same, denoted
as i = ∗, ai = a∗, bi = b∗ (i = m + 1, · · · ,m + `), then
(15) can be rewritten as
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6
ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x| + (1− ηx)α∗
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
βj
|x′| + (1− ηx′)β∗
(16)
where α∗ = a
∗
b∗ and β
∗ = 1−a
∗
1−b∗ . We consider the following
expression of privacy budget for an item-set
x = ln
(
ηx
∑
i∈x
ei
|x| + (1− ηx)e
∗
)
(∀x ∈ D) (17)
which can be regarded as the combined privacy budget of the
items in the set x (the privacy level of dummy items will be
involved when |x| < `, i.e., ηx < 1). Generally speaking, the
combined privacy budget defined in (17) is larger than the
averaged privacy budget
∑
i∈x i/|x| because the exponential
function f() = e is convex with property
∑
i kif(i) >
f(
∑
i kii), where 0 6 ki 6 1 and
∑
i ki = 1. Based on the
results in Lemma 2, we show the fact that IDUE-PS satisfies
MinID-LDP.
Theorem 4 If mechanism IDUE with perturbation probabil-
ities ai, bi (i ∈ I) satisfies MinID-LDP for single-item input
with privacy budget 1, 2, · · · , m, i.e.,
αi
βj
=
ai(1− bj)
bi(1− bj) 6 e
min{i,j} (∀i, j ∈ I) (18)
then IDUE-PS with the same perturbation probabilities will
satisfy MinID-LDP for item-set input, i.e.,
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6 e
min{x,x′} (∀x, x′ ∈ D,∀y) (19)
where privacy budget of item-set is defined in (17) and the
privacy budget of dummy items ∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m},
Proof: See Appendix B.
According to Theorem 4, the perturbation probabilities in
IDUE-PS for item-set input can be determined with the same
way in IDUE, i.e., solving the optimization problems (10)
with only 2t variables and t2 constraints to get the optimal
solution (t is the number of privacy levels), or the constrained
models (12) and (13) with less computational cost to get
the near-optimal solution. For the privacy budget of dummy
items, theoretically, we can select ∗ to be any value from
{1, 2, · · · , m}. Though a larger ∗ will improve the utility
of dummy items, the result of frequency estimation for dummy
items will be ignored in aggregation because they are not our
task. Also, the value of ∗ (selected from the original budgets)
does not change the optimization problem and the optimal
solution because the objective function (only depends on
original items) and constraints (only depends on privacy levels)
are the same. Therefore, we select ∗ = min{1, 2, · · · , m}
to guarantee the privacy with smaller budget x in (17).
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of frequency
estimation for our mechanism IDUE (IDUE-PS for item-set
input) and compare them with RAPPOR [4] and OUE [6].
Note that RAPPOR and OUE satisfy -LDP with  = min{E},
while IDUE and IDUE-PS satisfy E-MinID-LDP. The pertur-
bation probabilities in IDUE (and IDUE-PS) can be obtained
by three optimization models in (10), (12), and (13), denoted
by opt0, opt1 and opt2 respectively.
Datasets. We conduct the experiments over two synthetic
single-item datasets and three real item-set datasets, obtained
from public data sources.
(1) Power-law Distribution. The synthetic dataset with
number of users n = 100, 000 and item domain size m = 100.
The raw data of each user is obtained by generating a random
value from the power-law distribution with the law’s exponent
α = 2, then scaling and rounding into an integer that belongs
to I = {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
(2) Uniform Distribution. The synthetic dataset with num-
ber of users n = 100, 000 and item domain size m = 1, 000.
The raw data of each user is uniformly generated from
I = {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
(3) Kosarak [24]. An anonymous click-stream data of a
Hungarian on-line news portal. There are around 1 million
users with 8 million click events for 41,270 different pages.
(4) Retail [24]. A retail market basket dataset supplied by an
anonymous Belgian retail supermarket store. There are 88,162
customers who have bought 16,470 different items.
(5) MSNBC [25]. The real-world data that records the
sequence of viewed pages at the level of page category (not
the level of URL) of users during a twenty-four hour period.
There are around 1 million users with 14 categories, the
average number of visits is 5.7 per user. Different from the
previous datasets, the same category might appear multiple
times in each user’s record, which leads to the extremely
uneven sequence length for different users.
The Setting of Privacy Budget. We consider the multiple
privacy levels of the inputs, thus we need to assign multiple
privacy budgets to them. Assume there are four privacy levels
with privacy budget {, 1.2, 2, 4} (as default values), where
 is the system parameter of privacy budget. The privacy
budget for all items are randomly selected from the four
values with a certain budget distribution, where the default
distribution is {5%, 5%, 5%, 85%}, and we will change the
budget distribution and the number of levels in the experiments
to evaluate their impact.
A. Synthetic Data
Validation of the Theoretical Analysis. Fig. 3 shows the
empirical and theoretical results of the MSE of the estimated
frequency under Power-law and Uniform distributions. The
empirical results (solid lines) are very close to the theoretical
results (dashed lines), which validates the correctness of our
theoretical analysis. We can observe that mechanisms satis-
fying LDP and MinID-LDP have relatively similar utility but
IDUE with MinID-LDP outperforms RAPPOR and OUE by
10
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
25
50
100
200
400
RAPPOR
RAPPOR
OUE
OUE
MinLDP-opt0
MinLDP-opt0
MinLDP-opt1
MinLDP-opt1
MinLDP-opt2
MinLDP-opt2
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
200
400
800
1600
3200
Fig. 3: Comparison of Empirical (dashed lines) and Theoretical
(solid lines) results of synthetic data (single-item input).
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Fig. 4: Under different budget distributions
adjusting the perturbation probabilities for different inputs. For
IDUE under MinID-LDP, the reduced optimization models
(i.e., opt1 and opt2) have relatively larger MSEs than the
original optimization model (i.e., opt0) due to the further
constrained variable space, but they still can provide the near-
optimal solution for IDUE with less computational complexity.
B. Real-World Data
Influence of Different Budget Distributions. Fig. 4 shows
the results of Kosarak dataset (single-item) and Retail dataset
(item-set) with different privacy budget distributions, where
the first item of each user in Kosarak dataset are extracted to
obtain the single-item version. Since RAPPOR and OUE use
the minimum value of all privacy budgets as the uniform bud-
get, which is independent of the budget distribution, we only
show one line for RAPPOR and OUE respectively. From Fig. 4
(a), we can observe that our mechanism IDUE outperforms the
other two mechanisms and its MSE would gradually get close
to the MSE of OUE when the budget distribution becomes
more uniform (i.e., {25%, 25%, 25%, 25%}). But when the
proportion of insensitive items with larger privacy budget is
increased, the advantage of discriminating inputs with different
budgets becomes much more obvious. Fig. 4 (b) compares
the performance of the default (approximately exponential)
privacy budget distributions with 4 different levels (t = 4) and
exponential budget distribution with 20 levels (t = 20) where
the values are uniformly selected from the range [1, 4] and
their distribution is exponentially proportional to the budget
(i.e., ∝ ei ). The results show that our mechanism outperforms
the existing ones for item-set data as well.
Influence of the Padding Length ` for Item-Set Data. For
our mechanism IDUE-PS satisfying MinID-LDP with privacy
budget of item-set defined in (17), we use opt0 to solve
the optimization problem. Fig. 5 shows the results of Retail
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(a) Retail dataset
1 2 3 4 5 6
1010
1011
RAPPOR-PS OUE-PS IDUE-PS
1 2 3 4 5 6
109
1010
1011
RAPPOR-PS OUE-PS IDUE-PS
(b) MSNBC dataset
Fig. 5: The total MSE of all items (left) and MSE of top 5
frequent items (right) under item-set input.
and MSNBC dataset with different padding length `. We can
observe that the IDUE-PS outperforms the other two both in
the total MSE of all items and the MSE of top 5 frequent
items under different `. This is partly because our MinID-LDP
notion is more fine-grained than LDP, and the privacy level of
our IDUE-PS mechanism is relaxed compared with LDP since
x that is defined in (17) for each set x is larger or equal to
min{i}i∈x. Another notable observation is that the padding
length ` would have a great influence on the mechanism
performance. If ` is too small, the frequency estimator will
underestimate the frequency and becomes biased because the
actual sampling rate is less than 1/`; if ` is too large, the
variance will be enlarged since the frequency estimation result
is multiplied by ` [7]. Both of the two cases will lead to bad
utility and how to determine a good ` for set-valued data will
be our future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new privacy notion named ID-LDP with
an instantiation MinID-LDP is proposed to provide input-
discriminative protection in the local setting. MinID-LDP is
shown to satisfy the sequential composition theorem as LDP
and can be regarded as the fine-grained version of LDP. We
propose the perturbation mechanism framework IDUE that sat-
isfies ID-LDP, where the perturbation probabilities are solved
by the optimization problem with reasonable scale. Then,
based on Padding-and-Sampling protocol, the mechanism is
extended to apply to item-set input, named IDUE-PS, to solve
the scalability and utility problem for the item-set type of
input. IDUE-PS is also shown to satisfy MinID-LDP. Finally,
experimental results validate the advantage of our privacy
notion and mechanisms, compared with the existing ones.
For future work, we will extend our work to handle more
complex data types (e.g., high-dimensional data) and complex
analysis tasks such as heavy hitter estimation.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: Denote vector vi = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] with
length (m + `), where only the i-th position is 1 (i ∈ I ′).
From the Padding-and-Sampling protocol in Algorithm 2,
Pr(y|x) =
∑
xs∈x∪S
Pr(xs is sampled) · Pr(y|xs)
= ηx
∑
i∈x
Pr(y|xs = i)
|x| + (1− ηx)
∑`
i=1
Pr(y|xs =⊥i)
`
= ηx
∑
i∈x
Pr(y|vi)
|x| + (1− ηx)
∑m+`
i=m+1
Pr(y|vi)
`
(20)
where ηx is defined in Lemma 2. On the other hand,
Pr(y|vi) = Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 1)
∏
k∈I′\i Pr(y[k]|x[k] = 0)
=
Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 1)
Pr(y[i]|x[i] = 0)Φ =
a
y[i]
i (1− ai)1−y[i]
b
y[i]
i (1− bi)1−y[i]
Φ = α
y[i]
i β
1−y[i]
i Φ
where Φ ,
∏
k∈I′ Pr(y[k]|x[k] = 0) > 0, and αi, βi are
defined in (14). Since the value of y[k] is either 1 or 0 and
αi > βi, then βi 6 Pr(y|x=vi)Φ 6 αi (∀i ∈ I ′). Thus,
we have Pr(y|x)Φ 6 ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x| + (1 − ηx)
∑m+`
i=m+1
αi
` and
Pr(y|x)
Φ > ηx
∑
i∈x
βi
|x| + (1− ηx)
∑m+`
i=m+1
βi
` . Finally,
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) =
Pr(y|x)
Φ
Pr(y|x′)
Φ
6
ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x| + (1− ηx)
∑m+`
i=m+1
αi
`
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
βj
|x′| + (1− ηx′)
∑m+`
j=m+1
βj
`
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: Denote αmax = maxi∈I{αi}, βmin = minj∈I{βj}.
According to αi/βj 6 emin{i,j}, we have α∗/βmin 6 e
∗
and
αi/βmin 6 ei (∀i ∈ I). Then (16) can be rewritten as
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6
ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x|/βmin + (1− ηx)α∗/βmin
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
βj
|x′|/βmin + (1− ηx′)β∗/βmin
6
ηx
∑
i∈x
ei
|x| + (1− ηx)e
∗
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
1
|x′| + (1− ηx′)
=
ηx
∑
i∈x
ei
|x| + (1− ηx)e
∗
1
= ex
where x is defined in (17). On the other hand, according to
αi/βj 6 emin{i,j}, we have β∗/αmax > e−
∗
and βj/αmax >
e−j (∀j ∈ I). Then (16) can be rewritten as
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y|x′) 6
ηx
∑
i∈x
αi
|x|/αmax + (1− ηx)α∗/αmax
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
βj
|x′|/αmax + (1− ηx′)β∗/αmax
6
ηx
∑
i∈x
1
|x| + (1− ηx) · 1
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
e−j
|x′| + (1− ηx′)e−∗
=
1
ηx′
∑
j∈x′
e−j
|x′| + (1− ηx′)e−∗
6 ηx′
∑
j∈x′
e−j
|x′| + (1− ηx′)e
−∗ = ex′
The last inequality is obtained by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Finally, Pr(y|x)Pr(y|x′) 6 min{ex , ex′} = emin{x,x′}.
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